The George Washington University Budgetation, A Group Thesis Prepared by the Following Members of the 1962 Class of the Navy Graduate Financial Management Program by Bass, J.A. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1962-01
The George Washington University Budgetation, A
Group Thesis Prepared by the Following Members







GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
BUDGETATION 
A G=oup Thesis Prepared by the Following Members of 
the 1962 Class of the Navy Graduate Financial Management Program 
Major J.A. Bass, USMC 
I. LCDR K.W. Jonge ard, SC, USN 
LCDR S.K. Kauffman, CEC, USN 
LT R.J. Knapp, USCG 
LCDR J .N. HcCabe, SC, USN 
of the 
Navy Graduate Financial Management Program 
January 1962 
Dr. A. Rex Johnson. Director 
The-::. 1 s 
5 e. t..l- ~ ~ 8 ·lJibrary 
U. S. Nav:1l Postgraduate Scliooll 
.1ontercy, Calif .•r nia 
: I. 




U.S. r.,n·al Postgraduate Schoof 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
INTRODUCTION 




OVERVIE"t-l ·OF BUDGETATION 
A DECISION PROCESS • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 






III. AN EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19 
IV. BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING • • • • • • • • 28 
v. BUDGETATION AND ORGANIZATION • • • • • ••••• • • 37 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 54 
LIST OF ILLUSTPATIONS 
Figure 
1. Program Element Coot Projection . . . . . . . . . 
Charts 
1. Schem:1~ic of, Unified Command Plan . . 
.• . . . . . • • 
2. Schematic of Unified Command Plan with . Logis~ics 
Command . • . . . . . . . . • 










Were the reader to search for a definition of the term 
BUDGETATION in any conventional reference, the odds of his success 
would be indeed remote. It is a term that is offered for purposes of 
development as a function of Imagination, and expressed by the formula: 
BUDGEIATION equals BUDGET plus IMAGINATION 
Broadly speaking, a budget may be defined as a financial plan. 
Thus the actual definition of BUDGETATION depends on the quality and 
quantity of imagination added to the financial plan. In the past the 
addition of this variable has produced such budget titles as perfor-
mance, program, and functional. What these terms mean is at best 
determined by the semantic interpretation placed on them by each person 
involved with the budget operation. Therefore, it is concluded that 
BUDGETATION is actually the art of executing a financial plan based on 
the imagination and objectives of its originator. 
Since the end of World War U the art of BUDGETATION in 
Government has been practiced in an atmosphere of a desire for 
; 
economy. However, to a great extent the variable, imagination, 
remained relatively constant and stagnation of the art resulted. In 
1 
2 
1960 there appeared on the scene one Charles J. Hitch, writing on the 
Economics of Defense in the Nu~r Age. He invoked the idea that all 
military problems are to some extent economic problems in that resources 
are consumed. It is the purpose of this paper to report in lay terms 
Mr. Hitch's concept of BUDGETATION with respec~ to the Department of 
Defense, and, explore the present and future implications of his program 
relative to organization and administration of . that department. 
.'» 
CHAPTER I 
OVERVIffi.l OF BUDGETATION 
One change, Hhich I believe \·Jill improve my ability to 
make sound dec is ions in matters effecting national policies, 
is the new planning - programing - budgeting process within 
the Department of Defense that Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Hitch described to you in de t ail on July 24. Under this new 
process, the Secretary of De f ense for the first time will 
have an integrated financial management system specifically 
oriented to the manner in vJhi ch he is to make decisions - by 
program in r elation to over-all Department of Defense military 
missions .•· 
In making the foregoing statement before the Subcommittee 
on National Policy Machinery on 7 August 1961, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara affirmed his faith in Mr. Hitch's concept of budgetation; 
i.e., the correlation of military and financial planning. This 
unqualified acceptance of a structure, whatever it might be, requires 
at least a short biography of the architect. 
Charles J. Hitch was born January 9, 1910, in Boonville, 
Missouri. He received his early education in the public schools of 
that community and at Kemper Military School where he was graduated 
from Junior College in 1929. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree 
from the University of Arizona in 1931. After one year of graduate 
4 
study at Harvard, he went to Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship and 
received his Masters degree from Oxford. During World War II 
Nr. Hitch served on Mr . Averell Harriman's first lend lease mission 
to London, 1941-1942, and then in the War Production Board, 1942-1943. 
He was inducted into the U.S. Army in 1943 and assigned to the Office 
of Strategic Services. After his discharge as a First Lieutenant in 
1945 he served as Chief of the Stabilization Controls Division of the 
Office _of. War Mobilization and' Reconversion. In 1948 he j oined the 
Rand Corporation , a· firm of scientific consultants engaged in govern-
' 
ment research. Mr. Hitch remained at Rand until he was appointed 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp~roller) by President Kennedy on 
February 17, 1961. It was while at Rand that Mr. Hitch co-authored 
the book Economic.s 6f Defense "in t:he Nuclear Age which describes the 
pla1~ning, programming and budgeting process embraced by Secretary 
McNamara. 
Although notable improvements in the defense budget structure 
have been achieved since the end of t-1orld War II, they have been made 
. } .. 
mainly in the field of administration. Appropriation accounts have 
been reduced i~ number, comptro~ler organizations have been established, 
basic patterns have been developed for budget program and activity 
accounts, cost based budgetin~ . has been advanced, and financial 
accounting for material inventories is standard in all services. 
• t 
..... .. 
. ~: .' .. • l . 
5 
These improvements may be attributed to Mr. W.J. McNeil, the first 
Comptroller of the Depar tment of Defense. 
Upon taking offi ce, Mr. Hitch recognized the need for further 
improvement. This premi se is based primarily on the high costs, 
complexity, and rapidly changing technology of contemporary weapons 
syst ems. What systems for what missions have become key decisions 
around whi ch a majority of the de fense program revolves. However, the 
present system of financial manaJ ement does not relate costs to weapons 
systems , tasks, and mis~ions. I t s time horizon is too limited, time · 
phased costs of proposed programs are not disclosed, and data relative 
to cost and effect i venes s of a l t ernative progrzms are not provided. 
Mr. Hitch contends that if a financial management s~stem is to fulfill 
its function of providing management with essential facts and analyses 
consistent with sound decision making, the system must provide: 
(1) Alternative weapon systems ava i lable for each mission. 
(2) Effectiveness of each system relative to the mission 
to be performed. 
(3) Cost vs. effectiveness over the l i fe cycle of the 
system. 
In hi s book Mr. Hitch proposes a method of budgetation aimed at 
providing a system of financial management .which proy~des the afore-
mentioned criteria for sound decision making. His approach is basic 
in that he recognizes all military problems as involving an economic 
6 
factor in at least one respect; i.e., the allocation and expense of 
) . 
resources. This parallels a principle of war -- economy of force. 
. l, I •• 
Mr • . Hitch contends that these problems must be solved by systematic 
. ' 
analysis through the measure of cost vs. effectiveness. If an economy 
,, 
of force is to be &chieved it is essential that decisions affecting 
.. 
'·' 
the various services be made on the basis of roles and missions. In 
a sense it is intended that this factor should decrease interservice 
bickering before the public in general and Congress in particular, 
and stimulate competit i on for the assignment of missions on the basis 
of efficiency of opera t ion. 
j ,_ 
vJith respect to t he last point, it must b'e noted that though 
bickering before Congress may be eliminated, a far more perilous 
situa_tion might develop. In competing for the missions and roles, and 
the appropriations that go with them, it is conceivable that cost 
·;,' 
cutting . \-lithin the indi vidual services could become so extreme as to 
damage the military ef f ectiveness of the service~ 
\. 
Regardless of i ts possible shortcomings, Mr. Hitch's theory 
of correlating the mil i tary problem with an economic problem, and 
',. 
his concept of the role of financial management iri military decision 
making has raised the art of budgetation to a ne\11 high in a business 
:. ~ 
where there is no profi t and loss statement • It is theorized further 
.. '.':... · 
by the writers of this paper that with a nuclear stalemate as it now 
~ ' il ~ - : :t: . 
exi:;;ts, economic warfare may be substituted for war as we know t.t 
.. l ) •• 
., :--
and any measures which conserve resources while · maintai ning t:he.: 




A DECISION PROCESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an idea . 
of how the ' planning-programing-budgeting process is being carried out 
in the Department_. of Defense.. We have alreaqy seen the recent _ history 
which resulted in this new planning-programing-budgeting process being 
brought to the depar·tment. Irt the third chapter the evolution of 
budgetation through the history of the country will be discussed. 
But here \'le are concerned with how it works now.. First, however, let 
us see from Mr. Hitch's own words why a new system .was necessary. 
The revolution in military technology since the end of 
World War II, or even since the end of the Korean war, has : 
had a profound, effect on the character of the military· 
program. The great technical complexity of modern-day 
weapons, their lengthy peri'od of development, t;heir · 
tremendous combat power, and t heir enormous ·cost have placed 
an extraordinary premium on the sound choice of -inajor weapon 
systems in relation to tasks and missions and ·.our national · 
security obj~·ctives. These choices have become, for the top 
management of ,·-the Defense D1a·partment, the key decisions · 
around which'• much of the Defense program revolves. 
Yet, i ·t -· iS precis.~ly j.n this area that the financial 
management system showed its greatest weakness. It did not 
facilitate the relating of costs to weapons systems, tasks, 
and missions. Its time horizon was too limited. It did · 
7 
8 
not disclose the full time-phased costs of proposed programs. 
And it did not provide the data needed to assess properly the 
cost and effectiveness of alternative programs •••• 1 
The sharp decisio11-making tool devised by Mr. Hitch and the 
Secretary of Defense, Mr . McNamara, does relate cost to weapons 
systems, tasks, and missions. It gives to top Defense management 
the information needed t o make the most important decisions, the 
decisions which must be made to determine the major forces and 
weapons systems which wil l be used to carry out the missions of 
defense. This new tool presents information on the ·available 
alternatives in terms of their military worth in relation to their 
2 
cost. This last sentence is important. Available alternatives, 
military worth, and cost are all key words or phrases in the 
planning-programing-budge ting process. 
The key phases to the operation of this process are three . . 
They are: 
(1) review of requirements 
(2) formulat i on and review of programs extending years into 
the future 
(3) preparing annual budget estimates. 
1Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery 









The first phase, review of requirements, is not a review in the 
traditional m~itary sen~e. The studies which made up this review 
are military-economic studies which compare alternative ways of 
carrying out national security objectives. The people who make 
these studies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the!. people in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (QSD), and in the military departments, 
try to find the alternative which does the most for a given cost or 
the alternative which attains a particular objective at least cost. 
The questions these people try to answer are basic ones such as, 
how many strategic b,embers an~ how many mis.siles should we have during 
the next ten years in case we have to destroy priority targets? 
What kind of military airlift and sealift do we need to meet our 
various plans and -what is the most economical way to get what .we 
need? ·Should we keep our old ground equipment and fix . it up, 6r 
should we buy new, or should we hurry up the development of still 
better hardware? Is the .Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization 
program the best way to modernize the fleet or are we wasting money 
that should better-be spent on new ship construction? 
Some of these questions are complex and are_ freque ntly 
··interrelated . . .. ~o. find answers, various research groups in the 
Department of Defense and in t~ civilian econbmy have _been called 
upon. These groups used the pewest techniques of information 
10 
evaluation in an eff ort to correlate the many variables that influence 
the answers t o these questions. The studies made have been directed 
at the most important areas and the information developed has been 
used in the second phase of the operation of the planning-programing-
budgeting dec i sion t ool. 
The second phase - formulation and review of programs extending 
years into the future - was a ssigned to the military departments to 
carry out , at l east the f ormulation part. The reviewing was -done in 
OSD. Instructions as to how the formulating was to be done were 
provided by Hr. Hitch and his staff in OSD. These instructions stated 
that during the second phase - also called the programi ng phase - cost 
and effectiveness compar i sons '•70uld be made, " ••• for the most part 
using statistica l cost e stimates and factors rather than the more 
3 detailed information supporting the final budget submission." These 
cost and effectiveness comparisons are compiled into program elements 
and program packages. Program elements are integrated activities, 
combinat i ons of men , equipment, and installations whose effectiveness 
can, in some way , be r e lated to national security policy objectives. 
Program packages are interrelated groups of program elements that are 
considered together because they support each other or are close 
substitutes for each other. An example of a program package is 
3Memor andum fo r the Assistant Secretaries (Financial Hanagement) 
of the Army , N~vy, and Air . For ce from Assistant Secretary of Defense 





Central War Offensive Forces. The elements in this package, as in 
every other package, have a common mission or set bf purposes which 
tends to make them fall into a common package. The B-52 bomber, the 
' 
Atlas Missile' and the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FB:t-1) Submarine weapons 
systems are examples of program . elemen'ts which go to make up the 
Central t.-lar Off~nsi.v·e Forces program package. There are nine program 
packages in all: 
I. Central Har Offensive Forces ' 
II. Central trJar Defensive Forces 
III. General Purpose ·Forces 
iv. Sea · and Airlift Forces 
V. Reserve and National Guard Forces 
vr.· R & D (including space) 
VII. Servicewide Support 
VIII. Classifi'ed Projects (Top Secret and above) 
IX • .. DOD . 
As can be seen these are · all important missions, tasks, and functions 
which must be carried out by the Armed Forces. 
Perhaps the ·u:se of an example would be helpful to further 
explain how the program packages and program elements 'fit into the · 
decision-making concept of the -pl anning-programing-budgeting process. 
The purpose of ·the process, to r eiterate, is to prepare cost and 
effectiveness' comparisons·' to show for the available alternatives their 
military worth in relation to their cost. 
' . 
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Suppose we take a program ele~ent which would fall, were it 
not a ficticious one, in Program Package I, Central l-iar Offensive 
Forces. The element we wi ll use is one based on a \vild dream 
refinement of a weapons system with tvhich we are familiar. Call it 
Polaris IXa.. This is to be a 6000 mile range, solid fueled missile 
capable of carrying a 50 megaton ltlarhead. The missile is to be fired 
from soundless, non-metalic, accoustically non-reflecting submarines 
cruising 1000 fathoms deep. It is to be capable of follm..ring a 
non-ballistic flight path (a zig-zag course in flizht) and is to be 
able to hit consistently within one quarter mile of a target. The 
'' 
effectiveness of such a weapons system \-vould be high. But how about 
t he cost? 
The concept of cost as it applies to a program element means 
complete cost. I t includes research and development costs, procure-
ment or investment costs (missiles, submarines, repair facilities, 
replenishment bases, etc.), and maintenance and operation costs of 
the entire weapons system for at least five years into the future and 
preferably for its entire effective life. 
The cost project ion might look like Figure 1. The total cost 
would be the sum of the costs represented by the three curves on the 
chart. The research and development costs are shown as their time 
schedule would have them occur. The same is true for procurement 











Program Element Cost Projection 

• 
The program element would therefore show the ultimate cumulative 
total cost of the system for its effective life • 
If a Polaris IXa were priced this way, if similar information 
were available for an element •·1e might call Minuteman " 70", and if 
measures of relative effectiveness4 of these weapons systems were 
available, a decision could be made about 'vhich element to buy. 
It is apparent that this kind of decision tool, this planning-
programing-budgeting concept, provides an insight into the complex 
military-economic decisions facing top Defense management never 
before available. The information is arranged so it can be studied 
and evaluated; it is arranged so that mission capabilities can be 
compared. 
It happens that the program elements and program packages 
are arranged and assembled so that the information about the major 
portion of the Navy is included in Program Package III, General 
Purpose Forces. All of the estimates for combatant ships and 
support vessels are in this program package, except for the strategic-
missile-firing submarines, which are in Package I Central War 
Offensive Forces, radar warning picket ships in Central "!-Jar Defensive 
Forces, and the Military Sea Transportation ships, which are in the 
Sea and Airlift package (Package IV). All the estimates for the 
4 Relative effectiveness factors are prepared based on studies 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD, and research groups such as the 
Weapons Evaluation Group. 

• 
various fleet aircraft units except for airborne early warning 
squadrons are in Program Package III also, as are those for all 
Marine Corps units including the Marine aircraft wings. 
Some of the Navy and Marine Corps costs are in Program 
Package VII, Service,-7ide Support. This is a catchall or "all other" 
package with elements such as recruit, technical, and professional 
training; supply and maintenance system overhead, medical support, 
and so on. 
Returning now to the list of key phrases of the planning-
programing-budgeting process, we see that we have covered the first, 
review of requirements, and part of the second, the formulation of 
programs. But the second phase a l so includes review of the programs. 
This function has been done by OSD and Mr. McNamara himself. With 
the elements of a program package arrayed before him on a number of 
large briefing panel boards,. Mr. McNamara studies the information and 
decides which elements will be included in the package and which will 
be rejected. He decides how much of each element there will be, if 
any. He balances and weighs all the information about all the weapons 
systems in one place, in one format, at one time and he decides. 
The military departments are informed of the decisions and are 
told to proceed accordingly with the third phase of the planning-
programing-budgeting process -- preparing the annual budget estimates. 
The reader will recall that the cost estimates prepared for the program 
16 
elem12nts were ma de " fo r the l.llO S'i: part .us i ng statis tical cost 
estimates and factors " and that the final budget would contain 
more detailed inf ormation . It may also have been apparent as the 
explanation of the prev5_ous phase, the f ormulation pha s e, unfolded 
that the cost e s t i mates \vere not being arranged so that they tvould 
fit easily into the existing appropriation structure. However, all 
the costs were included in the elements. The research and devel opmen t 
costs - the costs of develop ing a new capacity to the point where it 
is rendy f or opera tional use - these were included. So we~e the 
investment cost s, the one-time or initial outlays required beyond the 
development phase to intJ_· oduce a new capabi l ity into operational 
use. And t he opera ting costs, the costs to maintain and operate the 
capab i lity year by year throughout its projected operational life 
were also in the elements. The trick is to put the e l ement together 
in the f irst place with codes on each item of cost. The codes 
indicate that the cost is R & D or Investment or 0 &.M. They also 
tell the year or years i n which the cost will occur, the appropriation 
to which the cost belongs, the element in which the cost belongs and 
so on. t-Jhen the item costs are assembled into an element .- and this 
assembling is done wi th a computer - the element code is used. ~!hen 
the elements are sent back to the departments for budget preparation, 
the appropriation code is used to break out the costs in traditional 




For instance, iri. preparing the cost estimates for _the program 
element Destroyers DDR· (radar picket destroyers), the~ Bureau of Naval 
Weapons· (BuWeps) m·ay have included an item of cost for new'· search 
radar. This ·separate and· distinct cost item; procurement of new 
search rada= for a DDR, would be punched out on an automatic data 
processing (ADP) card. - That card would be coded to the program 
element Destroyers DDR, to theyear inwhich procurement would be 
made, to the maintenance and opera tions part of the element (but not 
for the ' original investment), and to the procurement appropriati_on. 
For tne i nstallation· cost of this same radar ·the Bureau of Ships 
(BuSHIPS) would prepare ·another card coded to the same program element, 
to the year installation would be made~ to the maintenance and operations 
part of the element, and to the Operat~on and Maintenance, Navy 
appropriation for the -proper year~ These cards, together with 
thousands of others, whe~ processed through ADP equipment provide 
the kind of summary information needed to prepare budgets as we11 as 
to show- total estimated- costs of individual -program elements and 
program packages. 
This then is the planning-programing-budgeting process as 
it has been used in the Department o'f · Defense for developing the 
fiscal year 1963 budget. One of t he more significant features of 
this process which has emerged to date is that in making the decisions 
on the program packages, the Secretary of Defense does not consider 
how big a slice of the Defense approp~iations pie to give to the Navy 
or the Army or the Air Force. He decides hou much of our national 
·f • 
resources will be spent on a program e1~ment. Polaris does not 
cc~pete in the Navy with Anti-Submarine ~·larfare. Polaris competes 
in PI"ogram Package I, Central War \)ffense Forces, with the B-52 and 
Atlas and Minuteman. The shape of the Navy of the future depends on 
the elements selected by the Secretary of Defense. 
This new process turns the harsh lig~t of effectiveness, of 
cost, and of reality on the plans and on the programs ,of all the 
services. Vannevar Bush said of military planning in 1949, "This 
is not planning; it is a grab bag . It will lead us to waste our 
substance.1i 5 It appears that after t1.>relve years the grab bag is 
finally being closed. There can be little doubt that this new 
decision process is as the Comptroller of the Bureau of Ships has 
said, " .•• a step forward such as has not been made in a long, 
6 long time." 
5 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (Ne,;-r York: Simon & 
Schus ter, Inc., 1949), p. 251. 
6 
Captain Frank Jones, USN, BUSHIPS Comptroller, Talk to· Navy 








The impact of Nr. Hitch, h i s book, and his program packages 
' ' ' 
on the De~artment of Defense budgeteers was that of a bombshell! 
How radical his ideas and thoughts must have seemed when first 
announced! But were they as revolutionary as they actually appeared? 
Perhaps a partial answer can be found in Mr. Hitch's testimony before 
' 1 
the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery on July 24, 1961. 
In his prepared statement, Mr. Hitch said that he \-1anted to make clear 
that the Department of Defense was not starting the task of improving 
its planning-programing-budgeting process from "scratch·." He then 
outlined many advances in the Defense Department'~ budgetary process 
-
that had b~·en achieved by his predecessor, Mr. W.J. McNeil, the first 
Comptroller of the Department of Defense. Could Mr. Hitch have gone 
even farther back in time and shown that all advances in the budgetary 
process, including his own, are a result of a logical building block 
. . . . , . 
. .. ---
approach to the ideal? 
1 . ' ' 
Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Hearings, 
1st Sess., 1961, p. 1005. 
19 
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Unlike Mr. Hitch we shall, in this study, start from "scratch ." 
In so doing, we shall determine whetHer or not program packaging is a 
revolutionary idea in budgeting or ti ' logical step in the evolutionary 
process of improving the executive budget. 
The first approach to budgeting in the United States was the 
J! 2 
establishment of the Treasury Department by the Treasury Act of 1789. 
As stated, this act only approached budgeting; it 'did not make any 
provisions for an executive budget. The act did require the Secretary 
of the Treasury " • • • to prepare and report estimates of the public 
revenues, and the public expenditures II The.se estimates , com-
bined into what was called a "Book of Estimates," were far removed 
from what we know today as the executive budget. These estimates 
were not compiled in accordance with any one principle, 
or in such a way that their significance could be clearly 
seen. There was no budgetary message; no proper scheme of 
summary, analytical , and comparative tables • • • • . 3 
expenditures were not considered in connection with revenues. 
From 1789 to 1796 the executive branch virtually administered 
the finances of the country single-handedly. With such a concentration 
of financial power in the executive department, it was only a matter 
of time before Congress would assert its po"1er and e·stablish firmer 
fiscal controls over the executive branch. 
2 1 Stat. 65. 
3A.E. Buck, Public Budgeting, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1929), p.l7. 
-, In 1796, the House ended the executive direction of the 
government's finances by appointing a Committee on Ways and Means •. 
This Committee was made a permanent standing committee in . l802 and 
' ' •• fu-nctioned until -1865 with both revenue · and appropriation authority. 
During this time', the • Secretary of the Treasury continued to present · 
his annual report to Congress and also to submit a ~ook of Estimates 
setting forth the expenditure requirements of the variOlJ'S departments 
and agencies • His:· function, however, was primarily clerical. 
The concentration of both revenue and appropriation 
authorl,ty in the Ways and Means Committee made possible a 
comprehensive · v.iew .of the. state of the nation's . finances~ In 1865, 
largely due to tthe volume of work created by the Civil War, the House 
established a separate Appropriat i ons Committee and gave it the 
responsibility of overs.eeing appropriations measures. Thus; the 
unity ·of ~iew that had. previously prevailed when the Ways and Means 
Committee had both revenue and ·appropriation authority was. los:t and 
has yet to. be .regained. 
- ·"'- : .. \<Jhen President Taft. took office in 1909, the government was 
operating at a substantial deficit. , This deficit was largely 
caused by the financial panic of 1907, the outlays occasioned by 
. th~ Sp~!}i;.~Jl-Americ_an tolar., .. and _!:pe in~r~as~d ~xpenditures of a growing_ 
nation~ Moun_tiJ!g· conce.~~ -~~ye-; .the s.tate of federal finances led 
President Taft, in 1910, to appoint the Commission on Economy and 
' 22 
Efficiency "to inquire into the methQds of transacting the public 
business." 
Two years of broad and detailed investigation by the 
Com.uission on Economy end Ef ficiency produced the first comprehensive 
study of national budgeting in this country and provided the main 
. 4 foundat i on for subsequent thinking on the subject. The Commission's 
report, The Need for a Na tional Budget, was submitted on June 27, 1912. 5 
Of the five main proposals made by the Commission, the most important 
from the standpoint of this study was that of recommending a functional 
classification for the expenditure side of the budget. Tha t is, the 
Commission recommended that the Congress be able to consider the 
budget in terms of work to be done or services to be performed rather 
than solely in terms of things to be acquired. These new functional 
class i fications, however, were no·t to be substitutes for , but additions 
to, the traditional classifications by organization units and objects. 
Here then, some fifty years before Hitch, we see a recommendation for 
a type of program budgeting. And interestingly enough, we also see 
the identical plan by both t he Commission and Hr. Hitch to present 
the budget in traditional appropriations format and also by functions 
or programs. 
4Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process i.n the United States, 
(Ne,., York: NcGr:aw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), p. 68. 




Unfor-tunately .for· the development of the budget system) the. 
political · climate in .l912 was not favorable either to President Taft 
or to any of his budgetary proposals. · Consequently, Congress took no 
action on. the Commissiort's recommendations, in fact, the report was 
not even -considered by the House Appropriations Committee to which 
it had been referred. 6 . In spite of the fact that no immediate · 
legislation resulted from the Commission'swork, the prestige of the 
Commission -and the s·trong backing of the President focused national 
attention on the subject of budgeting • . In a tangible sense, the 
work of the Commission contributed greatly to the· eventual. passage 
7 
of the Budget and Accounting ~ct in 1921. 
This 192l ·Act provided fox: .a · national budget system largely 
as was proposed by the 'Taft Commis.si:on on Economy and. Efficiency. 
The budget required by the Act included provisions for a .comprehensive 
treatment · of both revenue and expenditure. The expenditure side of 
the budget, however, was cast solely in the traditional appropriations 
format and did not follow the Taft .Commission's recommendation for 
an additiortal functional classification. · · 
The .. first .Commission .on Organization of the Executive Branch 
of t~e ~overnm.ent was cr~ated by_ !'u.Pli.C:. Lat:~ 162, ~Otq C_ongress, in 
response to the recognition ·of the need for further improvement in 
6william F. Willoughby, The Problem of a National Budget, 
(New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1918), pp. 20.- ·23. 
7 Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting, .(New .York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 21. 
8 the executive branch . This Commission, popularly called the first 
Hoover Commission, concerned itself chiefly with the structural 
reorganization of government depart~ents, agencies, and bureaus, 
and with their relations lm each other<,p:. The Commission's first 
recommendation under the heading, "Reform of the Budget," called 
for the adoption of a performance .budget, i.e., .a budget based on 
functions, activities, and projec'ts. 9 Thus, in 1949, the first 
Hoover Commission repeated the same recommendation made in 1912 
~y the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency. 
In addition to the performance budget recommendation, the 
Commission recommended a general revision of the Government's 
complicated appropriation structure with the object of simplification 
of presentation, consolidation of certain appropriations in broader 
categories to eliminate itemization (which often obscures the totals), 
and merging of patchwork appropriations procedures into a rational, 
10 
uniform, easily understandable pattern. 
The first Hoover Commission's report on the national security 
organization included the recommendation that a performance budget 
11 be adopted by the Department of Defense. This recommendaticn<,was 
-------------------------------------------------------------
8Approved July 7, 1947, expired June 12, 1949. 
9Hoover Commission, Hoover Commission Report, (New York: 
t1cGraw-Hill, Inc., n.d.), p. 36. 
10
_rbfd'.' pp. 38-39. 






put · into : effect by the Amendments. of 1949 ·to the · National Security Act 
of 1947. · Under the author.ity 'of the · Amendments·,: the appropriation 
structure of the Departments · of Apny ·and Navy ·was .ctlmpletely r ·evised • 
The newly •created Department of the Air Force (1947) had its 
appropriation structure cast init ially in ' the pattern developed for 
the Departments .of the · Army and Navy. 12 The .present- uniform . 
appropriation-·account pattern for the three military departments and 
Offi-ce of Secretary of Defense groupS ' all appropriations into "five 
categories: "' 
(1) Mil i tary Personnel 
(2) Operations and Maintenance 
(3) Research, Development, Tes·t, and Evaluation: · · 
' (4) . Procurement . 
·(5) Military Cbnstruction · 
As significant as thi~ streamlining, of appropriations was, .. . 
examinat.i,.on of the ·foregoing five categoiies shows that any budget . ' 
prepat;ed on the. basis of. these categor.ies· would not be· a true 
perfottnance budget. Although called :a performance budget; there . 
is tl~ .. i<Jent.ifica_t;f.on. of f'l,lnct .ions,._, activities, or projects as called 
for in the first .Hoover Commissic;m . Report .- Regardless · of budgetary 
12u. ·s. Congress., Senat~, Committ•ee on Government Operations, 
Financial Management in the Federal Government, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1961, pp. 168-169. 
semantics, the National Security Act ~endments of 1949 did provide 
f or increased central i za tion of author~ty and direction of budge t ary 
13 
matters in the Office of· the Secretar~ of Defense. 
Although the Department of Defense' s performance budge t was 
a st-riking improvement i n the comprehensibility of the defense budgets 
disenchantment with so-called performance budgeting was not long in 
coming from both congr essional and academic sources. Cong'res s ional 
dissatisfaction can bes t be demonstrated by reciting Representat ive 
Taber's feelings on the subject: "Do you have anything in the bill 
that would repeal a provision like this performance budget , which 
is costing the United States at least $5 billion a year at t he 
t ti ?"14 presen me. Representing the academic side, Smithies , in 1955, 
devoted a chapter in his book to the necessity and desirability of 
program budgeting in the Defense Department . 15 In this chapter , 
Smithies looked upon the performance budget of the Oepartment of 
Defense as inadequate , · and indicat ed that the next evolutionary 
st ep in defense budget ing was the supplanting ·of the performance · · 
budget by a program budget~ Smithies ' disapproval of the existing 
13George A. Lincoln, et al , Economics of National Secur ity, 
( Englewood Cliffs: Pr entice-Hall, Inc. , 1954), p. 408. 
14Hearings on Department of Defense and Related Ind~pendent 
Agencies Appropriati ons for 1953, Part 2, p. 140. · 
I· . . ·! i·,; . 
15smithies, Chapter XI, pp . 229- 277. 
... ~ -· . . 
) 
• 
performance budget was basically the fact that, in spite of the name, 
it was.!:!£! a performance budget. In using the term, "program budget," 
he was essentially using a new te~ to describe a true performance 
~udget of the type originally proposed ·by the first Hoover Conmission. 
Interestingly enough~ Smithies gave credit in the preface to 
The Budgeta~Process in the United States to several gentlemen of the 
RAND Corporation as having substantj.ally influenced. the defense chapters 
of his book in both major and minor respects. One of · the gentlemen 
named . w~s Charles Hitch. It is useless to speculate on whether 
Smithies influenced Hitch, or vice versa, with respect to program'· 
budgeting. Regardless, we see in Smithies' b9ok the concept of a true 
performance budget, called a program budget, six years before the advent 
of Mr. Hitch and his program budget in the Department of Defense. 
We mu~t _conclude that the i ntroduction of program packages into 
. ·~ 
the Defense Department in March, 1961,. was not revolutionary; rathet;, 
it was the implementation of the true performance budget concept that 
had been proposed as early .as 1912 ~y the Taft Commission, ·restated by 
the first Hoover Commission .in 1949, and that had been considered in 
public pr i nt years before as the next step ·. in the evolution of a 
satisfactory budget making process in the Defense Department. 
CHAPTER IV 
BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
The preceding cbapters covered the evolution of the budget and 
the Hitch uprogram package." This chapter will present some of the 
alternatives in budget ing, accounting and reporting in the -Department 
of Defense which have been implemented and which could --be implemented 
:::o carry out the program package concept. 
BUDGETING 
The three servi ces are reporting their budget requirements for 
funds by three breakdowns. The first and oldest of these budget 
breakdowns is by appropriation. 1 
This is the breakdown which the legislative branch has 
historically used in checking the past efficiency and future requirements 
of the three services, and it's the basis for granting funds. 
1 This has been generally called a breakdown by performance but is 
actually a breakdown by object of expenditure; such as, Military Personnel , 
Research and Development, etc. Program Budgetingj Theory and~tic~, 




The second budget breakdown is by category. 2 The primary 
categories of the defense classification .are: 
·Military Personnel -Costs 
-Mainten~nce and Operations 
rfujor Procurement and P.roduction Costs · 
Acquisition and Construction of Real Property 
Civilian .Components 
Research and Development 
Industrial Mobilization 
Establishment-Wide Activities 
The Departmen~ of Defense established the .requirement for a breakdown 
by category in 1950, in orct~i:' to enable acc1;1.rate. comparison of past 
efficiet:t-CY in the use. qf funds wi~h f1,1ture need·s of the three services. · 
The ~bird . budget breakdown is by Hit·ch' s nine program. packages. 3 
The requirement for a program package b~dget was.:., first effected for . . · 
fiscal 1963, and was . establis~ed to pr.omote efficiency and economy by 
program .. capability • 
. ~he budget b~eru~down by -appropriation has been c~anging since 
1950 when the b~dget break~own by category was required until at the 
present date the two are almost identical.4 
2 Ibid., pg.87. 
3supra, Chapter II, pg.lO. 
4Program Budgeting: n1eory and Practice, pg.88. 
~.9 
Uhen these two methods of budget reporting: are so similar, doesn't it 
seem logical that one can be eliminated? The budget breakdown by 
category requirement was established by the Department of Defense. 
I sn't it probable that this budget breakdown could be discontinued now 
t hat the Department of Def€nse also requires a budget br eakdown by 
program package? The authors believe the requirement for the budget 
~reakdown by category wi l l be eliminated in the fiscal 1964 budget. 
Even if the budget br eakdown by category is elimi nated ~11e sti ll 
have two budgets to prepare. What are the probabilities of only 
preparing the program package budget? Why can't appropriations be 
nade on the basis of program packages? Public Law 84-863 directs the 
head of each agency to take whatever action is necessary to achieve 
( 1) consistency in accounting and budget classification, (2) synchron-
ization between these classifications and organizational structure, 
and (3) support of budget justification by information on performance 
and program costs. When Congress has expressed the ' need· for program 
costs» it appears they would welcome an appropriation breakdown by · 
progratll; however, Nr. Hitch has state'd that his present plan i's td 
present . the budget in both ways (program and appropriation) ~· 5 
5Hearings before the Subcommiq:~e .on .. NatLo.nal .. Policy .Machinery 
of the ·committee on Government ·operations, u.s. Senate, 87 Congress, 
. . . .. , 
1961, pg.l019. . :- .. : 
.: ' .. :..:.· .. ...... :·\:. 
) 
The second Hoover Commission in its report on Budget and 
Accounting· stated that ·for management purposes, cost operating budgets 
6 be used to determine fund allocations, and that such-budgets should 
be supplemented by periodic reports:. The program package .budget will 
7 
supply management with ·the necessary informat-ion -for fund · allocation. 
When the program package ' budget meets the requirements specified by so 
many varied sources, isn't it logical that the only method of budget 
reporting will soon be that by· program package? 
ACCOUNTING 
Accounting must be compatible with budgeting in order that a 
comparison of actual- ·costs -to planned costs can be made. The present 
obligation-expenditure accounting used by the services gives a good 
comparison of commitment·s made agai nst authorized appropriations ]Jut 
does not show the costs of carrying out a program. Accounting 
procedures ·· should be changed· so that records are maintained py program 
package in order that expenditures·· can be compared to the budget plan • . 
-
6A cost· type budget has been defined . as one which identifies, 
in terms of the goods and services consumed by each activity, the cost 
of the .prQgram .pla~ned . by the agency. Financial Management in .the 
Federal Government prepared by the staff of the Committee on Government 
Operations·, United States Senate, pg. 96. 
7Hearings before the Subcommittee on .National Policy Machinery . 
of the Committee on Government Operations, u.s. Senate, .87 Congress, 
1961. Testimony of theSecretary of Defense on 7 August 1961. 
The authors see three possible plans of establishing accounting 
procedures that will furnish the re~ired information (1) complete 
8 
accrual accounting, (2) accrual accounting at Bureau level only and 
(3) modified obligat ion-E~xpenditure accounting. 
The accrual accounting system will give the most accurate co~t 
of the program package operation. It would record the cost of all 
servi ces and material used. The unit9 would need an accounting force 
to record costs of supply support, . communicatio11 service.s, repair and 
overhaul, military and c i vilian pay, accrued leave, etc. The 
experienced officer, enl i sted and civilian personnel in the Department 
of Defens.e could form t he nucleus of the work force required. Howevc:;::, 
it is questio~able if Che accuracy of complete accrual accounting 
v10uld justify the gre:ater expense of ,this system over either limiting 
accrual accounting to the Bureau level or a modified obligation-
expenditure accounting . 
Another disadvant age of accrual accounting is that it requires 
commitment of funds at the t~e material and services are used and not 
at the t:ime the order fo r material or services are made. In this way, 
for an example,five or s i x years ago your predecessor could have 
8 . . An accrual accounting system is one which gives recogpi~ion 
to the receipt of goods and services and the consumption or · use o·f 
resources and reflects the assets and liabilities. Financial Managem~ 
:i.n the Fe.deral Gover nment prepared by the staff of the Committeeon 
Government Operations, United S.tates Senate, ·pg.96. · 
9 A unit is defined f or the purpose of this thes:i. s as a log i ca l 
subdivi sion of an element , an example wou l d be an individual destroyer . 
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committed you to pay for material received and used today.. The bills 
would have to be paid out of the current year's appropriation. The 
present obligation-expenditure accounting requires the party placing 
the order for final use mat~rial or services to obligate funds so that 
these funds are available for expenditure when the material or service 
is received~ In this way a predecessor of five or six years ago is 
required to set aside funds from his appropriation so that when the 
material is received, there will be funds available to pay for it. 
The second method of accounting mentioned--accrual accounting 
at Bureau level only--will give fairly accurate yearl~ program cost, 
although not as accurate as complete accrual accounting. The Bureaus 
or equivalent, will establish an a~erage accrual cost for each unit 
in an element. As an example, a destroyer DDR operating in Program 
Package III, General Purpose Forces, would have .its cost of repair and 
overhaul determined by the Bureau of Ships as an average for all ships 
in this category. The Bureau of Ships would have obtained this 
information from ~eport~ fr~m shipyards, repair ships, and tenders. 
The Bureau of Personnel wou.ld compute a cost for military personnel 
from the average complement aboard this type of ship, taking .into 
consideration accrued leave, travel costs, etc. The .accrual accounting 
would be computed for the various elements .at· the Bureau level. A 
total of the costs of elements assigned to a progr~m package would 
furnish the total cost of the program. 
34 
Th~ . third method 'of accounti~g. ~hich ' the authors consider 
. . · • • . • I . . I' 
feasible is a modified version · of the present obligation-expenditure 
accounting. The element costs· wouf d be obtained through a method of 
st·atistical · sampl{ ng; As an example, the .Bureau o'f Personnel ~ould . 
obtain a . report from 'fi ve destroyers DDR once . each qu.arter regarding . 
personnel ·on .board. From thi s report they would compute payroll cost s, 
accrued leave, travel expenses, etc. This Bureau would then have 
avai,lable from this inf ormat i on the statistical average cost of 
military personnel for ·the destroyer DDR element. All' t he other. 
Bureaus would obtain s lm:flar ·infonTUition for their area · o'f responsi-
b,il ! ty until the total cost of .the element· was available. Personnel 
. . . 
of the ·individual :u·n.lt would not have to change their accounting 
procedures under this syst'em or a system i~ 'which 'accrual accounting 
is ·done at the Bureau leve'i. ,,. l ·i 
P..EPORTING 
' . 
vJe ·have S·tated t hat we thought ·it logical that accounting 
would not change ~aterially at' the unit l ~vei. Hould i t ' follow~ then» 
that repCirt ing would r emain michang·ed as ·well? We hel t'eve not; 
Reports · from the unit will have' to justify ·more fully · that the greatest 
amoun..; of 'return· t>f mat eria l ·ali~ ~e~v:ic~~ :~re ol:>'tairied f or each dol lar· 
expended. The past •policy of 'staying· ~Tithi~ moneiary i'imitations will 
, • • I , ., •• J 
.. 
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now be changed to one of obtaining maximum efficiency and economy. 
The reporting procedure will not emphasize how much of the funds were 
expended but rather how much was accomplished for each dollar spent. 
SUMNARY 
The authors believe that a financial management organization 
which will fully meet the Secretary of Defense's requirements for 
program package accounting and reporting can be established with a 
minimum of accounting changes in the field. The expenditure accounts 
will need minor changes to record the applicable program package and 
will require a somewhat greater attention to detail. The appropriation 
structure will remain unchanged at present with the hope that eventually 
the appropriation and program package will coincide. The cost of a 
program will be computed over the life of that program including 
(1) research and development (2) acquisition of the initial material, 
upkeep of the material, replacement of material, and modification 
and (3) personnel and support costs of operation. When the life of 
the program is the basis of computing costs, the determination of 
expenditure of funds for material at the time of placing an order 
(obligation-expenditure accounting) or expenditure of funds at actual 
time of use of material (accrual accounting) should be determined on 
the basis of which system requires the least accounting and expenditure 
of funds for record keeping. The authors feel that complete accrual 
36, 
accounting will de~initely :l.ncrease costs due to t~e greater requirement 
for records. Mr. Hitch has repeatedly expressed his desire for the 
' . . 
gre.fttest· possible return on the dollar expended; therefore •. we feel 
that either the present system of obligation-expenditure accounting or 
of accrual a~counting at Bureau level only ~·1111 be the ultimate polic.y 
of the Department of . Def ense . 
The adoption of the program concept allows the executive . 
branch (Defen~~ Department) to select the weapon or weapons that will 
give the country t~e maximum. return in offense, defense or suppor~ 
for each dollar spent. Under the present appropriation accounting 
system co.rrective a~tion car1 only be .taken to .keep funds within legal -. 
- limits. Und,~r program accounting cor.rective action can be taken to 
improve efficiency py det ermining the plan which will giv.e maximum 
return for a s~ecifie4 amount and/or the required result at · the least 
possible __ cost. _ _It , fu.r ther will give a long range plan to which can 
be compare~ the a~tual costs given by the reporting structure with 









BUDGETATION AND ORGANIZATION 
The objectives of this paper were to paraphrase the Hitch 
"planning-programing-budgeting concept in lay terms, to examine it in 
its proper historical perspective, and to project where this innovation 
which melds military planning and financial management might be leading 
us in the areas of budgeting and organization. 
The preceding chapter dealt with the impact this system 
would have upon accounting and reporting. It will be noted that our 
thesis is built upon the premise that the Hitch concept, which was 
1 initially developed as a decision-making tool, would in a short period 
of time become the foundation of the DOD financial management system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what logical 
impl·ications the adoption of the Hitch concept as the foundation of 
the DOD financial management system could have upon organization within 
the Department of Defense. 
1 U.S. Senate, SubCommittee on National Policy Machinery of the 
Committee on Government Operations, Hearings. Org·anizing for National 
Security, 87th Cong. 1st Sess., 1961. Testimony of SecDef McNama on 7 Aug. 
This thought apparently was of concern to the members of the 
Senate SubCommittee on National Policy Machinery when Mr. Hitch 
testified on 24 July 1961 . Senator Jackson (D., Wash.), the ranking 
member of t he SubCommittee, asked "If the organization of the program-
packages along these l ines makes sense for reasons of budget and 
decision-making, is i t not possi ble that they make sense for the 
actue l ·organization .of t he forces?" ·Mr. Hitch replied, ·· 
·There will be no change. I am not saying there will be no 
organi za i:ional changes in t he future ~ but VTe don 't a t present 
envis :ton ·any change in t i1i s respect. ·Certatnly, ideally, the . 
way yoa pro3~am and budset should par a l lel the way you are 
organized; they a.:-e interrelated ~ But the two do not have ~. to 
mesh perf ect l y . 
Later on :b t~1is same testimony, Mr. Hitch sta t ed t hat it i s 
~ .. . . 
pos s ible t hat t hi s approach would serve to reduce "some of t he 
Servi ce ident i fica tions in some of the areas. 11 Again i n this 
(".. .• 
testimony, Mr . Hitch aver r ed to Senator Jackson that there may be 
some organizational impl i cations involved in connection with this 
approach i n f ormulating t he budget, and added that "In genera l, t he 
i ·-
Secretary said , when he took the job, that he want ed to \o7ait at 
least a year be f ore he made up his mind about the organi zational 
:-· ·. ·t I' 
problems of t he o·epart rnent. I don't want to anticipate hi m." 
It would be pr esumptuous to concl ude other than as Mr. Hi tch 
has 'te.stified, that t here are no-i.inmedi ate· plans···ror any milit~:rY 
reo~g~niz·a·~ion wlthih th'e DOD. It is the tlieSi·s ··of· this ~aper, 





however, as ha9 been pointe9 O\lt in the_ preceding -chapters, that 
changes in budgeting, a~counting , and .rep9rting systems, and now 
organization are evolutionary. They are the product of progress. 
Examine the trend in organization. Between World War I and 
Horld 1-Tar II·, there were over f;i f ty bills .introduced in Congress to 
2 
unify the Services in one . form qr another. , ln fact, on 20 June 1941) 
the Navy ·General Board unanimously re~ommended that 'unification' 
take place - a single department with a.' Joi~t Chiefs of Staff composed 
3 
of two officers, in~luding one air officer, from each Department. 
This 1!'Tas u.nsuccessful ~ At the outbreak of vlorld War II, ·the first 
real unification came whe~ the British ~nd American Chiefs of Staff 
were combined. Subsequently, unified co~ands were formed in the 
· '· 
field, such as, MacArthur (South West Pacific) ai!d Nimitz (Pacific 
Ocean Area) in the Pac.ific, and Ei senhower in Europe. Following ' · 
\o-1W II, unification of forces in · the field was made permanent through 
the ·National Security Act of 1947, and all its subsequent amendments. · 
The ~bjective was complete unif~cation - Qf forces in the field and 
centralized -strategic direction .from Washington. At thi-s writing, the 
2 T.W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security 
(Washing~?n: Public Affairs ·Press, 1956), · p.68 •. 
3 . . . ' 
~.; p.70. 
· "" ' .. . 
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Unified and Speci f ied Commands are: European, At l antic, Pacific, 
Alaskan, Caribbean , Continental Air Defense, Strategi c Air Command, 
and Eastern-Atlantic-Mediterranean.4 
The creati on of t he Defense Communications and Defense 
Intelligence Agencies were consistent with this trend . Probably 
even greater signi ficance can be attached to the r ecent establishment 
of. the D~fense . Supply Aeency. .. The particular importance of this 
latest change is t he simila r i ty in organizational impact bet"t-7een it 
and the DOD Reorgenization Act of 1958, which abolished the roles of 
the Service Secretaries as Executive Agents in the oper ational chain 
of command . For example , in the Pacific area where the Unified 
Commander is Navy: prior to 1958, the Secretary of t he Navy had been 
in the operational cha in of command between the Joint Chi efs of 
Staff and the Ut1i fied Commander, CINCPAC. The objective of the 
Reorg~nization Act of 1958, was to streamline the chain of command 
and shorten the l i nes of communication. We do '·not take is.sue with 
this change. Bu·t . rather, we highlight these two changes as indicative 
of the decreasing roles bei ng played by the individual service 
departments. 
4 
. Col. J.D. Nicholas USAF, Col.G.B. Pickett USA, . and 
Capt. H.O. Spears, Jr . , USN, The Joint and Combi ned St aff Officer's 




This briefly traces th~ happenings of the past and we believe, 
. f 
identifies the current trend ~n organizational development. This has 
been a relatively simple task. A more difficult task is this - if 
these are the neffectsn of the trend, what is the llcause"? What is the 
driving force that brings about changes? 1jJhy do we alter systems? Uhy 
have there been so many reorganizations within the DOD? The immediate 
answer is "improvement... But more deeply, improvement that can be 
identified with "economy and efficiency." These are the magic words. 
This is the banner under which changes are heralded. 
Obviously, we believe that "economy and efficiency" is the 
force that provides the impetus to change. And we will examine this 
force more objectively. First, however, in the interests of fairness, 
we must present the viewpoint of those who perceive dangers along this 
route. 
These groups have argued that too much concern for "economy 
and efficiency" introduces an unnecessary degree of caution which can 
narrow visions ·of growth potential and result in a failure to reach 
attainable goals. This philosophy translated into a military situation 
can be dangerous. They point out that the greatest periods of growth 
this country has known were made during times when "economy and 
efficiency" we.re n()t paramount considerations. They contend that 
· "economy and e'fficiency" carried to the ultimate in planning and 
( 
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·· budgeting would result in progl·ams, projects, and activities being 
allowed just ."enough" and -not one ·unit more. -This "enough" could be 
men, mOney, - or materials. But given this condition, how much latitt1de 
is allowed for individual initiative? · And what is the probability tha t 
this calculated "enough" is really enough" These are thoughts worti:y 
of serious reflect ion. 
· These gr oups ·point to a specific area of concern in the Hitch 
program. The -Services are to compete for roles and missions that now 
overlap~ The criteri a are to be relative cost and military effective-
ness. They contend t hat the Services tvill be budgeting unrealisti-
cally to gain competi tive assignments. This can only lead to "cutting 
costs" - which · means a reduced ·quality of hardware, skimping on 
service, and a performance capability that is less than optimum. 
Further, once a Service has an exclusive role assignment, there ··will 
be no competition among the Servi·ces. vJhat will happen to costs 
then? Are we ·being penny-wise and': pound foolish? 
To climax this balanced· point of view approach, the economic 
facts of life must not be overlooked. ,· Hr. Hitch wrote that "economic 
stability should not dictate defeO:se · polici-es. " 5 Hhat is economic 
stability? How accurate are -our -economic forecasts? How valid are 
5c.J • Hitch and R.N. :. ~McKean, The ·Economi:cs of Defense· in the 





the assumptions ? Are economic factors considered in formu l ating 
alliances and international commitments, and other fe_.a.tures of national 
• 
policy? This paper will not examine these questions. They are pointed 
.) out to indicate t hat these are some of the factors that determine how 
much of our nat ional resources shall be allocated to defense. 
Whether these allocations of resources are too much or too little is 
another matter, the fact remains however, that these dec i sions bring 
into bei ng forces tha t shape the evolutionary trend in organizational 
development. As defense expenditures require more and more of the 
national income, measures are tak en in the form of "economy and 
efficiency" to obt ain more defense for the appropriated dollar. This 
appears logical. However, it also presents something of a paradox 
if the view of too much "economy and efficiency" is detrimental to 
the national welfare is accepted. 
~lith this point of departure, let us exa.mine this force of 
"economy and efficiency" more closely. Although it has undoubtedly 
been a force for many years, it came for~most to the publ i c attention 
with the Commission on Economy and Efficiency during .the administration 
of President Taft. Since that time, many governmental reforms in 
budgeting and organization have been heralded under the banner of 
"economy and efficiency." This is an objective that cannot logically 
be argued against. 
( 
We predict that this will be the battle cry for greater and 
greater unification within the Department of Defense. 
He have identif ied some of the recent organizational changes 
that have been implemented because of increased economies and 
efficiencies. Now let us examine some of the other areas that could 
logically be exploited under this same technique. Consider the 
following as examples. Why is it necessary to have Navy and Army 
hospitals in the same general area? Cannot a doctor regardless of 
service treat a patient regardless of service? It has· been done. 
Why is it necessary to have so many separate service ·schools teaching 
approximately the same thing? Does an Army cook learn how to prepare 
meat different from a Navy· cook? Why maintain separate service 
recruiting offices in the same post offices all over the country? 
Cannot one service representative handle the recruiting details and 
permit the applicant t o elect the service of his choice? What is 
' so different about civil engineering problems in the different 
services? These are but a · few of the many questions . tbat -could be 
asked ' and they all logicai1y indicate areas where gains in the form of 
"economy and eff:i'ciency" ~an be achieved through greater unification. 
· We should be quick to re~ognize that these "gains". are all in 
the · ar·ea of logistics. Recall that the functions of logistics are 
identified as: Supply, Medical Services, Transportation, Base 
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Development, P.ersonnel , and Maintenance and Modification. 6 Specific 
inroads toua.rds greater centraliza tion have already been made in. t;he .. 
fields of Supply and Transportation through Single Manager assignment-s. 
But what does all this have to do with the Hitch concept? 
These projecti ons of evolutionary development . in organization have no 
specific relationship with the Hitch 11 planned-program-package." The 
illustrations were made to support the thesis .that these projections 
are evolut ionary. They would have undoubtedly come into being 
w·hether or not Mr • . Hitch ever .became. the :POD Comptroller. 
If we can assume that e~ch ·organizational · change that has be.en 
f ormalized and inst i tuted, is p .building block which in turn shapes 
and influences the trends in organization, then what impact will the 
Hitch concept · per ~- have . upon the •. o;rganizatH>nal t rend? 
In the second chapter, the specific .p-rogram-packages in the 
Hitch concept were -identified. To reflect upon these for a moment, 
it is apparent that the first three packages . il;lolate the· " line" ·.or 
operating forces·. The remainder -of the pz:ogram-packages . could be 
identified as · " .supporting" forces. These are the Sealift and Airlift 
Forces, Reserve and National Guard Forces, Resear.ch .and -Development, 
. . ··' . . 
Servicewide Support, Classifi~d .Projects, and D0.9. Because of the 
6 U.S. Naval t.olar College, Basic Logistic Considerations,July 
1961, pp. 1-7. 
·4.6 
haste in implementing this Hitch concept, many of the assignments to 
i 
these packages were arbitrary. It ~s s~spected that this structure is 
not rigid and will be subject ao many modifications - some possibly 
before the preparation of budget e1stim~tes for the fiscal year 196l~. 
Mr. Hitch stated that there will .be a continuing task of adjusting the 
list to reflect change_s in the forces an.d programs, as well as in 
7 
plans, concepts, .and organization. 
\!lith this in mind, what changes could be in the offing? One 
of the basic objectives of the Jfi·tch concept is to cost-out military 
tasks and missions in relation to military effectiveness. Notice that 
the .ffrst three packages a re roughly divided into the functional areas 
of strategic offensive, defensive, and conventional· forces respectively. 
l urther notice that many elements of the last six packages exist only 
to support directly the first three forces or packages. Therefore, 
it appears reasonable that these elements should be accounted for 
within the program-package they support. 
For example, the fitth package - Reserve and National Guard 
Forces - is broken into elements according to Service and within each 
Service, further broken according to which of the packages they 
8 
support. Here and in other "supporting" packages where the elements 
7senate SubCommittee on National Policy Machinery, Hearings~ 
1st Sess., 1961, pg.l00.9. 
8 Ibid., pg .1009 
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can be specifically identified with a major mission package, · these 
elements can and probably will be· shifted to those packages. Concerted 
efforts are particularly underway to 'ide·ntffy those elements of package 
s even - Servicewide Support - which can be ascribed to the other 
. . 9 
packages, especialiy to '·the major mission packages. 
Can this· be correlated wi.th the trend toward · a centralized 
logistics organization developed ea rlier in this chapter? Consider 
as a poss i ble change in the forces and programs alhided to by 
Nr. Hitch, · that the nine program packages be reduced to the first three · 
functional force -'packages - plus one to be added; the Logistics· 'Force. 
(Note that this would not be the often ·discussed fourth service, but 
another Unified C6nnnand). These four forces would be: the Central 
War Offensive Forces, the Central War Defensive Forces, the General 
Purpos~ Fo,rces;. 'and the Logistics Force. Now further consider that 
this trend toward 'centralized logistics has been ·complet~d and that 
this Logistics Force would be comparable to ·the -Defense Supply Agency, 
responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense •. · Remember tha~ 
Supply and Transportation, two of the logistic functions, nave already 
become .hig-hly centralfz.ed, and that the other areas which present ' 
possibiliti"es of "·g'ains by economy and efficiency" are also iri the 
9interview with ' NavCompt .. Off i cials on 20 se·ptember ' 1961 
field of logistics, so that this possibility is not completely remote. 
This present~ a very interesting speculation on an organization evolution 
v1hich is developed in the appended charts. 
The current Uni f i ed Command structure is schematically portrayed 
in chart #1. The operat i onal chain of command extends from the Secretary 
of Defense through the Joi.nt Chiefs of Staff ·to the Unified Commander. 
Responsibility for administrative and logistic ·support, tactics and 
techniques, and peculiar research and development remains with the 
individual Service Departments for their forces assigned to the 
unified commands. The removal of all logistic support responsibilities 
f rom the individual Service Departments by the creation of the Defense 
Logistics Force ' '10uld change the schematic to that illustrated on 
chart #2. 
But where this possibility becomes the most interesting is the 
translation of the schematic chart #2 into a structural organization 
chart as illustrated on chart #3. The removal of the logistic 
responsibilities from the individual Service Department would leave 
them a shell of their f ormer organizational selves. They would be 
left with responsibilities which can be accomplished from the pos:l.tion 
of "advisory and coordi nating" staff where they are shown on chart 1F3. 
This would in effect accomplish in- a subtle manner ·an almost complete 
unification without the stigma of "single service" or "general staff" 





unification would be realized and still retain the identity of the 
individual Service - the continuity of competition - the perpetuation 
of the tact-ics and techniques peculiar to each Ser-Jice - which otherwise 
T,1ould have- to be created arttfically under. a single service organization. 
It is not the intent of the authors to adjudicate this as a 
desirable or an undesirable organization. It was our intent to 
indicate what appears to be a probable intermediate destination of the 
current trend in military organization. We use the term "intermediate 
destination" because it is recognized that organizational structures 
are fluid, and this projection was intended to capture one point, or 
at most, one period in time. 
Although as a group we have neither supported nor opposed this 
hypothesized organizational development, we do as a group support the 
following theme: The state of the world is extremely serious. Times 
and conditions are changing with amazing speed. Scientific-
technological advances and their effects in the past ten years have been 
more profound and far-reaching than most people realize. The impact 
of electronic data processing, better decision-making techniques, and 
improved communications facilities are being felt. All of these 
things have a decided impact upon organization. And they must also 
have a decided impact upon the thinking and attitudes of military 
officers. The day of parochialism is gone. Thinking and attitudes 
on military problems must reflect first and foremost - what is best 
for the Department of Def ense - and secondly, the individual Service. 
Although we do not wear t he same unifpr~m, and probably will not for 
several decades, we must think and work together with complete 
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